Value-Stock-Plus

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Investing is most intelligent when it is most businesslike - Benjamin Graham (1894-1976)

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Sunday, November 25, 2007

The rational investor looks beyond price

by Arne Alsin - FT

How do you value a stock? This is the single most important question that an investor has to answer. If you cannot generate an informed estimate of value, you should not be making buy-and-sell decisions.

All rational buyers of assets go through the same exercise. They ask two simple questions: “What does it cost?” and “What is it worth?” If you can look up a stock quote, you can answer the first question. But the answer, by itself, is meaningless.

Let’s assume you like a certain coffee retailer, so you decide to buy the stock. You look up the stock quote and buy at $50 a share. Before you bought, you answered the first question, but the answer is useless in isolation. Is the stock worth $75 a share? Is it worth $25 a share?

To attribute meaning to the $50 quote, a frame of reference is required. This is provided by the answer to the second question: what is it worth? As all sophisticated investors recognise, answering the second question is the nexus around which proper decision-making revolves. If value exceeds price by a wide margin, consider buying. If price exceeds value, consider selling.

If you do not calculate value you are, in effect, a blind investor. These investors base decisions on something other than a comparison of price and value. Because they do not have a frame of reference, they make decisions based on criteria that are almost always irrational.

Many blind investors will buy a stock because it has been increasing in price. They expect that the upward move will continue. Or they sell because the price has been on a steady decline. They fear the slide will continue. In spite of the fact that price information is meaningless by itself, investors ascribe predictive power to price.

This sort of silliness does not occur with other asset classes. If your neighbour offers $15,000 for your car that you know is worth $20,000, you are not going to accept the offer. You certainly would not accept his offer of $12,000 the following week. If he followed up a week later with a $10,000 offer, you would see it as nonsense and summarily reject it.

In the stock market, investors are prone to accept a lower offer for their asset when they don’t understand value. This is particularly true when prices are volatile. When the market gets crazy, investors get crazy.

When the market is in freefall, emotions easily infect decision-making. There is an analytical void when there is no frame of reference and emotions fill that void. Investors think they can divine a pattern to the price action. The result is that, in tumultuous downward markets, they make decisions based on feelings, not facts.

It is not easy valuing stocks. Valuation calculations are difficult because businesses are moving targets. While other assets are relatively static, businesses are constantly changing, requiring frequent adjustment to valuation variables.

The valuation model used by many analysts is based on an estimation of a company’s future cash flows, discounted to present value. There are other methodologies, such as the so-called relative valuation models – that is, a company’s value is forecast on some multiple of (or relative to) book value, earnings or free cash flow.

All stocks are mispriced. There is no such thing as a perfectly priced stock. Some are mispriced by a little, others are mispriced by a lot, but all are mispriced.

No matter which valuation methodology is employed, the idée fixe for rational investors remains the same. It is to measure value and compare that to price.

The fact that price deviates from value, and sometimes by a wide margin, is welcomed by the rational investor. Other investors obsess and worry about price volatility but the rational investor understands that his potential profit rises in concert with volatility.

The difference between the annual high and low for the average stock on the New York Stock Exchange usually approximates 50 per cent. Businesses do not oscillate in value that much. The average publicly traded business increases in value by about 7-8 per cent a year, with the increase being largely linear. That means that price change greatly exceeds value change. For the rational investor, at least, that equals opportunity.

The writer is a portfolio manager for Alsin Capital and the Turnaround Fund. arne@alsincapital.com

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007

Posted by toughiee at 7:22 PM | Permalink | Comments | links to this post

Saturday, November 17, 2007

'If China did not exist, Sensex wouldn't have traded at this level'

Global investors are comfortable buying Indian equities at a high price because Chinese equities are priced even higher

by Nesil Staney - Mint

Christopher Wood, managing director and global equity strategist of investment research firm CLSA, expects the Indian economy to grow in the range of 8-10% at least for the next 10 years. Wood said that the Sensex, the benchmark index of the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), crossed 20,000 surprisingly fast. He added that the target of 40,000 that he had set for the index back in 2003 could be achieved quicker than what was initially expected.

However, according to Wood, the key to Indian equities is China. Global investors are comfortable buying Indian equities at a high price because Chinese equities are priced even higher. This benchmarking (against Chinese equity valuations) is driving up stock prices in India, Wood said in an interview with Mint. “The valuations in (the) Chinese equity market is forcing investors to re-rate other Asian markets, most importantly India. If China did not exist, the Sensex would not be trading as high as it is today.” Edited excerpts:

What is the short-term view on Indian markets? Will foreign investors continue to buy Indian equities at high prices?

The Sensex crossing 20,000 so early did surprise me. India is an expensive market at present. However, global investors are comfortable buying Indian equities at a high price because Chinese equities are priced much higher. The huge valuations in the Chinese market is forcing a re-rating of all other markets, most importantly India. The target of 40,000 can be achieved much faster. The question, (of) when, is heavily dependent on China. If China did not exist, the Sensex would not be trading at the current level; it could have grown slower. If China goes out of control, Indian market will also shoot up.

Is there a bubble forming in China similar to what happened in Japan in the late 80s?

The Chinese market is an excellent breeding ground for a monster asset bubble. Given the lack of alternative investment opportunities in the country, Chinese equities will continue to rise. If the Chinese authorities continue with incremental tightening, there could be a monster asset bubble in China in less than three years from now.

Do you expect India to tighten policies on capital inflows?

India’s central bank tightening capital inflows is the single largest risk on this market for a foreign investor. The rise in currency is posing a great challenge for the policy-makers. However, the rise in currency is one of the factors that attract foreign investors to India. I think there could be a 5% annualized return on Indian currency.

If the US Federal Reserve continues to cut interest rates, what would be the impact on Asian markets?

The US Fed will no doubt continue to cut interest rates, creating inflation in the country. There is no discipline in their policy. Asian currencies will continue to appreciate against the US dollar. Central banks across Asia will have to fight this. Also, what we are witnessing now is the last stage of the US paper dollar (Federal Reserve Note). It will soon be history. This is not just my opinion; it is the market reality.

What is the outlook on global commodities?

There could be a strong correction in all commodities as the US economy is on a recession. This correction could happen in a short-term. However, I am highly bullish on gold in the long term. In my estimate, gold prices could go up to $3,500 (Rs137,550) per ounce in the long term.

What do you find the most interesting sector in India?

The most attractive stocks are those related to infrastructure, simply because of macro-economic reasons. The huge expansion in India’s infrastructure space will benefit this sector, as seen in the case of other parts of the world. Also, the Indian central bank could cut interest rate sometime next year. A friendly tax cycle would push the fortunes of automobiles and other consumer products. On the other hand, sectors that have huge exposure to the US economy are best avoided.

Posted by toughiee at 9:31 PM | Permalink | Comments | links to this post

Imitation is the Sincerest Form of Flattery: Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway

A new study by two university professors titled "Imitation is the Sincerest Form of Flattery" proves what a lot of savvy investors have known for years: buying the stocks Warren Buffett buys will make you a lot of money.

Abstract:

We analyze the performance of Berkshire Hathaway's equity portfolio and explore potential explanations for its superior performance. Contrary to popular belief we show Berkshire's investment style is best characterized as a large-cap growth. We examine whether Berkshire's investment performance is due to luck and find that beating the market in 28 out of 31 years places it in the 99.99 percentile; however, incorporating the magnitude by which Berkshire beats the market makes the “luck” explanation unlikely even after taking into account ex-post selection bias. After adjusting for risk we find that Berkshire's performance cannot be explained by assuming high risk. From 1976 to 2006 Berkshire's stock portfolio beats the S&P 500 Index by 14.65%, the value-weighted index of all stocks by 10.91%, and the Fama and French characteristic portfolio by 8.56% per year. The market also appears to under-react to the news of a Berkshire stock investment since a hypothetical portfolio that mimics Berkshire's investments created the month after they are publicly disclosed earns positive abnormal returns of 14.26% per year. Overall, the Berkshire Hathaway triumvirates of Warren Buffett, Charles Munger, and Lou Simpson posses' investment skill consistent with a number of recent papers that argue investment skill is more prevalent than earlier papers suggest..

Download the Research Paper

Posted by toughiee at 1:48 PM | Permalink | Comments | links to this post

Wednesday, November 14, 2007

Punting on future gains

INVESTOR ALERT!
Each bull market is based on its internal logic, one that seeks to explain the seemingly incomprehensible — a vertiginous rise of the markets. So the 1992 bull run had Harshad Mehta’s replacement cost theory. In 2000, Ketan Parekh spoke about the new economy and how it would cast aside the old order. This time, the bull phenomenon has a new logical framework, the esoteric-sounding ‘embedded value.’

This concept has been used to justify a rise in stock prices even as the fundamentals of the Indian corporate sector — operating margins, cash flow — are looking weaker than a year ago. So, is the market missing the woods of the fundamentals for the trees of “hazy” future gains?

Consider SBI, Reliance Industries and Larsen & Toubro. Over the past three months, these companies have seen their stock prices move up by around 50%. The reason for this sudden increase has been associated with the fact that these companies have wholly-owned subsidiaries that will contribute to the cash flows of the company in the near future and thus, need to be valued in the stock price.

A theory for the excesses?

Brokers have given a thumbs-up to the theory that they feel can explain current valuations of the Indian stock market. The theory has been gaining currency for the past two years, but it is only in the past six months that it has been quoted widely to explain the massive rise in certain stocks.

So much so that in August 2007, brokers and analysts believed the Sensex still had an upside of 20% on account of embedded value in certain stocks, which had not been reflected in the stock price. By the beginning of November, the market had moved up by 29% and had exhausted almost all of that value.

That, however, was not the end of the story. According to research reports, more than 20 stocks that are a part of the Sensex still have upsides that are not noticed by the market. Most reports are bullish on large cap stocks like ONGC, Tata Motors and SBI and believe there is still an upside for these stocks in a market that is hovering around 20,000.

Embedded or embattled?

Simply explained, embedded value is the market putting a valuation to earnings that are somewhat visible but may not be completely evaluated as they do not form the main aspect of the company’s business. Broking houses in India are seeing embedded value in many stocks.

Bharti Airtel for its towers, Bajaj Auto for insurance, ITC for hotels and paper — these are some of the companies that have assets or subsidiaries that are not valued in the mainline assets. The earnings are fairly visible to analysts or the markets and some amount of value can be attached to their businesses. The market, though, is now trying to attach embedded value to all companies — whether their earnings are visible or not.

Embedded value is calculated by doing a sum of the parts (SOTP) valuation — the stock price is divided into different businesses to arrive at valuations. While fund managers agree that the SOTP methodology itself is not a problem, the way it has been applied is. This happens when analysts try to value subsidiaries that will take a long time to show cash flows into present values of the stock price.

“The sum of the parts method should be used for understanding valuations as of today and not of the future. It has to do with today’s real numbers... If analysts are using embedded value to calculate values of businesses where earnings are not visible, then this becomes an exercise in fantasy. Embedded value is not about the future, but is about the present and those who are valuing the invisible future in stock prices have not understood this concept,” says Shankar Sharma of First Global.

The runaway value

Take, for example, Reliance. A research report based on August 1 prices stated that Reliance Industries had an upside of 25% when the stock price traded at 1,798. At that point in time, the valuation of the retail business worked out to Rs 80, which was constant for some time.

Much of the change in stock price was taking place due to the increasing value attached to the exploration and production side of the business. In the sum of the parts calculation of the Reliance stock price, the value of exploration and production had gone up by 135% in less than seven months and was at Rs 719 at the end of June 2007.

All broking firms that have brought out reports on embedded value use the SOTP method for companies whose subsidiaries will take a long time to show any business.

In October 2007, another broking house released a report on Reliance Industries where the E&P business was valued at Rs 745 and the retail business at Rs 182. Surprisingly, the retail business had a consensus value of Rs 80 in August 2007, which jumped to Rs 182 in a span of only three months, without any material change in business prospects.

According to the research report, the reason is associated with the fact that Reliance Industries has invested Rs 2,000 crore during the quarter into Reliance Retail and the “loyal customer base” has crossed the 1.5 million-mark. But the link between this and the cash-generation capabilities of the business is at the moment not very clear. After all, it’s cash the market values and not market share.

But Reliance Retail is not alone. State Bank of India is experiencing something similar. Analysts feel the AMC and insurance arm of SBI need to be reflected in the bank’s stock price. Insurance is a business where companies sell products for a long time before they actually start showing cash flows. But analysts feel the trick lies in grabbing the market share as this ensures future profits.

Based on this logic, both ICICI and SBI carry a part value of their insurance and AMC business in their stock price. The market feels the stock price should reflect the values of these businesses which are wholly owned subsidiaries. In August, the SOTP upside associated with SBI was around 44% when the price was at Rs 1,548. Today, the stock is up at Rs 2,237, capturing the SOTP valuations.

For most banks, their insurance subsidiaries are yet to have any impact in terms of profitability. Given the fact that some are gaining market share, it is important to see how relevant these market shares will be in terms of profitability. Tridib Pathak, CIO of Lotus Mutual fund considers embedded value only if the broader certainity of the business and cash flows are visible.

“People tend to go overboard. During the bull market phases, all aspects of the business get considered and during the bear market phase, even the main activity of the company is ignored by the market and stock prices lag behind. It is human behaviour,” he says.

A 'model' explanation

Optimistic research heads and analysts are running their spreadsheets again to rerate businesses. They believe many companies have changed strategies and there is an improvement in business — as a result, there should be a change in their embedded values as well. The trouble is, ‘embedded value’ is a broad concept. In many cases, even the simple revaluation of land gets carried forward in the stock price. Companies like Hindustan Unilever, which have undervalued real estates, are also getting rerated.

Shriram Iyer, head of research at Edelweiss Capital, which has worked on a report on embedded value, says as far as their report was concerned, the stocks achieved the target price mentioned therein. He feels that in a dynamic market, he will have to revisit the report to see if anything has changed for companies to revise their valuations in terms of their sum of total parts of businesses. But he agrees that barring a few exceptions, there may be no point in looking at embedded values or SOTP when the market is hovering at the 20,000-mark.

All this is reminiscent of the way markets had given internet companies large valuations in 2000. Back then, the revenues never materialised and stock prices collapsed. But then, these aren’t like internet companies. “The big problem today is that many companies who are ‘embedded value’ stars have real revenues in other businesses and hence, it is that much harder to disagree with valuation of loss-making subsidiaries,” says the India head of a multi-strategy fund.

Only visible earnings matter

Even if we agree that the business of wholly-owned subsidiaries should be valued into the stock price of the company, the fact remains that in many cases, the cash flows from these subsidiaries are not clear.

For the value of subsidiaries to be reflected in the stock price, the company should have made plans or announced the strategic sale of these assets; or there is an IPO or even demerger of these assets, and the subsidiary has a certainity of business and cash flows. When such things are not in the news, the value of these subsidiaries becomes at most speculative.

“Analyst reports clearly state that the main line businesses are expected to grow at 17-18% this financial year. That is fine. But the valuation of the subsidiaries into the stock prices and their growth rate is humongous.

Sometimes the growth rates for the subsidiaries are more than 150%. We understand the main businesses, and have no argument against the valuation of subsidiaries; thus, we accept whatever analysts tell us,” says a fund manager who does not agree with the sum of total part of stock prices or the embedded values in stock prices.

He believes these are concepts used in insurance, and there are people working overtime to apply the theory to stock prices. But Mr Iyer feels this approach to valuing companies is credible as significant value exists in balance sheets which is not near-term earnings accretive. “Some assets need to be valued separately to arrive at a fair price of the stock. It is a valuation tool and needs to be revisited all the time,” he says.

Source: ET

Posted by toughiee at 8:31 PM | Permalink | Comments | links to this post

Sunday, November 11, 2007

Be cautious at these levels: Rakesh Jhunjhunwala

Trader and investor Rakesh Jhunjhunwala said the space and speed of the rally has surprised everyone. He is a bit circumspect at these levels because credit conditions in America are not very good and Asian markets are deteriorating at a fast speed.

Excerpts from CNBC-TV18's exclusive interview with Rakesh Jhunjhunwala:

Q: Last year, you were telling everybody that 15% is great and that we should not expect 50% every year. We have done that again. Are you a bit surprised?

A: I would say I am surprised to some extent by at least the gain of the last one-month. The space and speed has surprised all of us.

Q: Do you think we can do an on core, third time lucky with 50% again or is that being too optimistic?

A: It is time to reflect, we have had a rise from 3,000 to 19,000-20,000. I do not think economic conditions in America are very good. Asian markets there are deteriorating at a fast speed. It is an economy, which is drunk on credit. The credit markets are value effected, so I will not be circumspect at these levels.

We have had such a humongous gain from 3,000 to 19,000-20,000. I think markets are going to consolidate around these levels and would feel more comfortable as an investor.

Q: Would you be cautious here or do you see much higher levels even next year on this base?

A: What makes me uncomfortable is the divergence in valuations. You cannot have Infosys making a 52-week low as their earnings have not come down and they are still growing 15-20%. It is one of India’s best performing investments in time to come. You cannot sustain this kind of divergence in valuations, where you keep giving value to momentum, and you lose all value to value. That would be the first sign of an indication, may be it could happen in a week, ten days, or maybe we are in it. May be it could not happen in the next three months and we could go 20% higher, but I think this is the first indication and we have to be very cautious in this market.

Q: When you say you are cautious, are you cautious because of the excesses that have happened? Is it why you are calling for a correction or have you in the medium-term too become circumspect?

A: There are two-three things internationally especially in America where we are facing large uncertainty. We don’t know how this uncertainty will pan out, what value will the dollar lose, and what disorder it can cause to financial markets. I am extremely bearish on US financial markets and think the sub-prime problem is going to be far larger than what people are imagining. There is a paradigm shift in India. The bull market is very much alive. The factors driving this secular bull market are very much alive and kicking, I have no doubt about it. I am hopeful that five years later we are going to be far higher than where we are today. But the fact remains that we at 19,000 are at 19 times 2009 earnings. There is vast divergence in the valuations of the Sensex or Nifty, you have very narrow group of stocks gaining.

Q: Undeservedly are you saying?

A: I will reserve my opinion there. The fact remains that in a true bull market you cannot have quality stocks going to 52-week lows. You can have stocks with no operating income, whose valuations are 100-200 times earnings. The narrowness of the rise, the uncertainty that we are facing, and the speed of the rise, is why I feel the markets need to pause. They need to take a breath and that will give it strength for the long-term rise.

Q: When you speak about a correction, are you speaking about a major sell-off or just about a 10-15% correction? We have seen three of those this year and we are still up 50%.

A: There is a difference between opinion and the empirical evidence of what the screen is telling us. In the last 15-20 days, flows from abroad have considerably slowed down. World markets after the second Fed cut are showing some kind of resistance and weakness. The market is losing breadth and is facing resistance at higher levels. The market should pause and correct, it is more than opinion, as that is what the screen is telling us. We have not had any correction right from 3,000 to 20,000. We have had very severe corrections but they have been related to prices, there has not been any timewise correction. What will really test people’s belief in this market and country will be when the market corrects not so much valuewise but corrects valuewise and timewise. I can’t believe we are going to have a ride from 3,000-40,000-50,000 where investors’ conviction and patience are not going to be tested.

Q: You see this as a likely scenario. Is 16,000 not inconceivable or are you looking at that big a correction?

A: Our last rise was from 14,000 to 20,000, so surely we could carry a 50-60% rise. Things internationally are going to turn far ugly than what people have anticipated. I don’t know valuewise, but timewise we are going in for a good correction. The sheer momentum with which any stock that has some kind of story build around it goes up at unbelievable volumes. I feel the market is ignoring a lot of stocks, these are the first signs of danger. For the whole rise, the market is going to test us timewise and valuewise.

Q: Are you getting the first sense of euphoria creeping into the screen after those 20-25% blowouts that you have seen in the last few weeks?

A: Absolutely, blowing into all kind of stocks. There are some bull and cock story scrips that are seeing tremendous volumes, unbelievable price rises, and nobody wants to talk any sense there. Somebody guesses, spread some story, and advises a buy and investors just go and buy. These are signs, the markets always do that, there is noting surprising about it. But when markets do this, it is time to be alert in my opinion.

Q: Are you surprised that Infosys is hitting a 52-week low while the market hits new highs. Is it a sector write off for you or do you see value there?

A: A bull market does not mean that some stocks just go up and everything else goes down in value. We are in the initial stages of what is going to be a very big, long-term bull market. In the last two-three months, along with international uncertainty we are staring at local elections in the next 6-12 months, which the markets may not like. Don’t forget that the worst mistakes are made in the best of the times.

I don’t agree with this theory that interest rates in America will go down, all problems will be solved, and all assets in the world will inflate. Markets have had a too good and easy this Goldilocks situation. This is a dream run, in the world this has never happened that you reduced interest rates and all ills are over.

You have given USD 2.5 trillion in one-year to people who did not have money to repay. I don’t buy this theory that he will keep reducing interest rates and we will keep buying emerging markets. You can’t take valuations to any level and expect people to keep on buying. Why have flows slowed down in the last two-weeks? Why is China down 5% today? All of Asia and all emerging markets have been weak in the last 10-12 days.

Q: Let me come to another sector which have been one of the pillars of this bull market, telecom. The big pillars like Bharti and even Reliance Communications have started correcting. What do you see for the next one-year for this space, is the best behind them?

A: Some of the dreams of corporate India are now going beyond all reality. Look at the people applying for telecom license, I don’t know what kind of background and qualification they have to go into the telecom business. Someone is doing a broking business and he wants to get into real estate, someone is doing real estate and he wants to get into the telecom business. The way the markets are giving money to public issues, it seems that nobody is even looking at the prospectus or reading it. They are just finding what the prices are in Rajkot and how much is the issue going to be oversubscribed. If you give money Rs 50,000-1 lakh crore or even Rs 10 lakh crore it is not going to be enough because of the way dreams are expanding and the way in which people are getting money, these are all danger signs.

Q: What is your sense on this whole oil and gas space, especially exploration and refining, and the way the market is valuing some of these stocks?

A: I do not apply my mind at all there. There is surely value in oil refining companies. IOC has got a lot of non-refining and non-marketing income. The market doesn’t want the government to decide what income they will have and whether there is very good yield. Never forget in all this momentum that in 1992 the price of Hindustan Lever was Rs 18.20 whereas the index was 4,300, but in 2003 when the index was 2,900 then HLL was Rs 328. As an investor I found that it is not how high my scrip goes, it is at what level it settles after it goes high. If a stock moves from Rs 100 to Rs 1,000 and comes back to Rs 20, then nobody really gains. But if the stock grows from Rs 100 to Rs 1,000 and then does it stop at Rs 600 or Rs 500, I don’t know.

Q: You were speaking about excesses. Have you found some excesses in any of the stocks which we discussed over the last few weeks?

A: I don’t know what is RNRL business, I am confused and didn’t make any effort to find out also.

Q: But RPL tippled and that has a business?

A: It has a market cap of more than Infosys. I can’t say anything beyond that. I am told it has a market cap of more than the entire refining sector.

Q: Some other ideas?

A: In four years, a share of Great Eastern Shipping has appreciated about 25 times. It was Rs 25, when the management bought back six crore shares, they got all those shares in the range of Rs 5-7.

Q: Will you remain cautious for the next few months or a year?

A: We live in uncertain ages and times. Let us see how this will pan out. We will react to it but let us be prepared. We will react to it as it pans out. I don’t know whether the index will stop at 16,000 or if it may have a bottom there, there may be no correction at all. I have some feelings and am going to react to it as the circumstances arise.

As humans and investors we must have the maturity to realize that we can’t earn the wealth without time passing, without it being tested, and without our conviction being tested. Nobody has earned wealth easily and retained it.

I feel we have had it too good and easy to really last. We are going to be tested. In view of the narrowness, rise of uncertainty in the world financial markets, the fact is that we are going to face an election, and the speed at which we have gone up, the only thing I am saying is be alert and cautious and always be there in the market.

Posted by toughiee at 3:58 PM | Permalink | Comments | links to this post

Rational Investing and Tricks the Mind Plays

by Jane Bryant Quinn -Bloomberg

How good an investor are you? If you're like the average Joe or Jane, you think -- for sure -- you're better than most. You remember every one of your winners, in detail. You bury your losers. You never average the two together, which means you have no idea whether you're beating the market or not. If asked how you're doing, however, you'll probably say that you're ahead.

This confident approach to investing does wonders for your self-esteem. Where it leaves your portfolio is another story. We all know we're not supposed to trust our emotions when we buy a stock. What we didn't know is that our investing brain is a traitor, too.

We're hard-wired to kid ourselves. If you doubt it, take a look at ``Your Money and Your Brain,'' a new book by Money magazine writer Jason Zweig. He visited the scientists who study the neural circuits that switch on and off when we invest. It turns out that our brains amount to a hostile environment. To be better investors, we have to work against what our minds want most to do.

Take one of our sturdiest investment beliefs: that with study, we can get good at predicting whether a stock or the general market will rise or fall. To do this, we search for patterns that can tell us what the future holds.

The human brain loves patterns. We see them even where they don't exist. Give us random facts and we'll assemble them into a story. Give us random data -- like the millions of stock quotes flying around -- and we'll arrange them to ``make sense,'' whether they do or not.

Seeing Patterns

You can see this tendency at work in a series of studies done at Dartmouth College. Researchers flashed red or green lights on a screen. The participants had to predict which color would come next. Eighty percent of the flashes were green but the order was random. Over time, the participants learned that green was the most likely call.

Rats and pigeons, fed when they made the right guess, quickly learned to pick green almost all the time.

That's not what human subjects do. We -- the brainiest mammal -- start trying to guess when the next red flash will come. We look for patterns, even when told that the flashes are random. The longer we play the game, the worse we do. Rats outscore us every time. Various iterations of this study have been done since the late 1960s, always with the same results.

Then there's dopamine, the brain chemical that spurs us to act when we sense the possibility of a reward. An unexpected gain -- say, a chat-board tech stock doubling in three months -- sprays dopamine over every available surface. If it happens twice, we're sure the chat board is in the know.

Getting Hooked

Zweig calls this our ``prediction addiction.'' We're addicts for sure. The brain activity in a cocaine user expecting a hit looks almost the same as that of an investor expecting a big score.

The startling thing about pattern seeking is that your brain makes you do it. You can't say no. The response is subconscious and automatic. Because you're unaware of what's going on, the patterns you see seem objectively true rather than neurally driven. Your dopamine turns you into a dope.

We find patterns fast. Two accurate calls will make you expect -- and bet on -- a third. Three is a ``trend.'' Studies show that people seeking new money managers tend to hire a firm after a three-year hot streak and fire one after a three-year cold streak (even though both of these streaks are probably about to change).

Seersucker Investing

The seersucker theory of investing says that, for every seer, there's a sucker. David Leinweber, an expert in quantitative investment, satirized the ``science'' of prediction by sifting through numbers to see how he could have forecast the performance of the U.S. stock market from 1981 through 1993. He combined the total volume of butter produced each year in Bangladesh with the number of sheep in the U.S. and a few other variables, to produce a formula that forecast the past with 99 percent accuracy.

Wall Street is afloat in back-tested formulas meant to forecast prices. The next time you see one, think baaaaa.

You can't quit predicting, but you can quit following your mischievous brain. Handcuff yourself to some form of automatic ``program'' investing. Buy-and-hold. Dollar-cost averaging. Fixed asset allocations (say, 70 percent stocks, 30 percent bonds), rebalancing when your portfolio drifts away from those levels.

Quit checking your stocks all the time. Those random squiggles will start looking like patterns before you can tear yourself away.

Finally, make an effort to find out how well you actually perform. For example, keep track of your stocks on Bloomberg.com's Portfolio Tracker. Average the winners and losers together to see how you've done each year.

While you're at it, keep track of the stocks you sold (something investors rarely do). If the ones you sold do better than the ones you bought, maybe your dopamine is still in charge.

Posted by toughiee at 3:17 PM | Permalink | Comments | links to this post

Saturday, November 03, 2007

Games hedge funds play

Source: HT Mint

India has a lot to learn from the double play that hedge funds used in 1998 to attack Hong Kong's economy

Have you heard of the infamous double play that hedge funds used to bring Hong Kong’s economy to its knees in 1998? India, as it tries to understand the games hedge funds play, could learn from that episode.

The Asian economic crisis started in July 1997. Hong Kong had initially done far better than Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia. Till it was attacked using what has come to be called the double play.

Here’s how it went. Hong Kong was committed to a fixed exchange rate against the US dollar through a currency board. By the end of 1997, a group of hedge funds thought that they could make a killing by forcing Hong Kong to devalue its currency. That’s what they had done successfully in many Asian countries in the preceding months.

What they did in Hong Kong was more complicated. In early 1998, the hedge funds built up their armoury by swapping US dollars for Hong Kong dollars. They then shorted the stock market in a sudden coordinated attack, both in the cash and futures segments. They followed it up by shorting the Hong Kong dollar as well.

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) was forced to increase interest rates all the way up to 280% to defend the fixed exchange rate. That brought down the stock market. The short sellers made a killing. Meanwhile, the Hong Kong dollars that the hedge funds had collected in the swap market started earning them usurious rates of interest.

The plunge in share prices led to a capital outflow and further pressure on HKMA to abandon the fixed exchange rate and sharply devalue the currency. That would have given the hedge funds that had shorted the Hong Kong currency another windfall. It was then that HKMA chose an unusual step. Rather than protecting the currency by selling dollars from its reserves, HKMA went in and supported the stock market. It bought $120 billion of shares in two weeks, because that was where the epicentre of the double play lay. (HKMA sold these shares at a huge profit five years later.)

So, why should India bother about an episode of a daring—and brilliant attack—on an Asian central bank 10 years ago?

I am not suggesting here that India will be in any similar danger any time soon. But there are two lessons worth remembering. One, hedge funds often take complicated positions that straddle the share, bond and currency markets. I am not sure that all the loose talk about hedge funds pouring money into India takes this simple fact into account—they may also be speculating in the offshore market for Indian derivatives and currency. The rupee and the stock indices may be part of coordinated trades that we know little about, or even care to know.

Two, the response in Hong Kong, too, was unconventional. HKMA is, like the other institutions in that great mercantile city, a committed bastion of free-market thought. Yet, it had no qualms about abandoning its standard practice and actually buying in the stock market to prop up its currency. The lesson: a central bank may need to use blunt instruments in special times.

In 1999, when the fires that raged across Asia had been doused, Barry Eichengreen and Donald Mathieson wrote a paper for the International Monetary Fund. It was called Hedge Funds: What Do We Really Know? (It is a question that still evades a clear answer.)

Eichengreen and Mathieson identified three main classes of hedge funds. First: the macro funds, which study a country’s economic fundamentals and take large, unhedged positions (going fully long or short) in that country’s markets. Two: the global funds, which pick stocks across the world based on the prospects of individual companies. Three: the relative value funds, which study correlations between the prices of various securities (emerging market bonds and US bonds, for example) and try to profit when prices deviate from their expected relative paths. Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), the hedge fund that was set up by some of the most highly regarded traders and financial economists in the world, was a relative value fund that tried to bet on prices that were off the path estimated by the fund’s statistical models. The story of how LTCM blew up in 1998 has been wonderfully retold in Roger Lowenstein’s book, When Genius Failed.

So, the point is a simple one. Hedge funds make complicated bets, often across countries and markets. They often do it with huge leverage. These funds are part and parcel of the modern financial landscape. They cannot be wished away.

India, too, is attracting billions of dollars of hedge fund money. That’s not a bad thing in itself. But there should be more clarity about what this money is all about. Given this fact, the central bank and the stock market regulator are justified in keeping a close eye on their activities.

Additional Reading:

  • Hedge Funds: What Do We Really Know? - Source: The International Monetary Fund Research Paper No. 99

    This Economic Issue draws on material originally contained in IMF Occasional Paper 166, Hedge Funds and Financial Market Dynamics, by a Staff Team led by Barry Eichengreen and Donald Mathieson with Bankim Chadha, Anne Jansen, Laura Kodres, and Sunil Sharma, and "The Near Collapse and Rescue of Long-Term Capital Management" in Chapter 3 of World Economic Outlook and International Capital Markets: Interim Assessment, December 1998, by Garry Schinasi. Readers may purchase the Occasional Paper ($18; $15 academic rate) and the WEO/ICM Interim Assessment ($36; $25 academic rate; also available on the IMF website).

Labels: Hedge Funds

Posted by toughiee at 9:36 PM | Permalink | Comments | links to this post

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